<html><body>
In the <a href="https://afr.com/p/national/top_of_pops_in_bubble_brouhaha_pil1zGaAUotPW0vRoUe8WN" target="_blank">Australian Financial Review</a> today journalist Adrian Rollins revisits the debate surrounding whether the RBA should use monetary policy to resist burgeoning asset price bubbles. This is well-trodden territory that I have written about more than most, and Rollins quotes my views in his article. While he does an excellent job of outlining the broad contours of the debate, there is some missing nuance that is worthwhile clarifying.
When I first started thinking about this subject I landed in the camp of those who felt that a central bank that autocratically lifted rates to “lean against” asset price increases – in, say, equities or housing – that were being fuelled by unseemly credit growth (e.g., via leveraged buyouts or a mortgage boom) could do more harm than good.
The first problem is one of policy distraction. Central banks typically have a singular policy goal, which is “price stability”. In simple terms, that means keeping the rate of consumer price inflation within a low and ideally stable band of 2% to 3% per annum.
In recent years the RBA has subtly re-cast the standard “inflation-targeting” model by describing its own approach as a “flexible inflation-targeting” regime. (The best summary of the Antipodean differences is offered in <a href="https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/rdp/2010/2010-06" target="_blank">this RBA paper</a> authored by Paul Bloxham and colleagues.) The introduction of the word “flexible” has been used by the RBA to denote the fact that it now believes it should have the freedom to deviate, in the short term, from the settings necessitated by its through-the-cycle inflation target if “financial stability” concerns warrant such action. In this context, financial stability is being employed as a euphemism for bubble trouble.
The most oft-cited case-study is the 2003 episode, which the RBA has slyly allowed to be rewritten in history as an example of a prescient central bank staunching an incipient house price bubble from emerging via the application of tighter-than-normal interest rate policy.
When pushed, the RBA publicly acknowledges that this is, in fact, <a href="https://www.switzer.com.au/the-experts/christopher-joye/macfarlane-rba-did-not-burst-2003-house-price-bubble-with-interest-rates/" target="_blank">incorrect</a>. That is, monetary policy in 2003 would have been the same with or without rapid house price growth. It was in truth the RBA’s experiment with much more aggressive “open-mouth operations” (exercising moral suasion over punters), and some subsequent changes in APRA’s approach to managing mortgage risk (via the risk-weightings imposed on lenders), which were the tangible policy responses to the asset price innovations at the time.
The first bone fide example of asset prices directly – rather than indirectly – determining the setting of rates in this country was the RBA’s much more rapid than expected normalisation of the cash rate over 2009 and 2010, which I pointed out to Rollins (see <a href="https://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Central-banking-esoterica-pd20100317-3LT6P?OpenDocument&amp;src=mp&amp;is=Property" target="_blank">here</a> and <a href="https://christopherjoye.blogspot.com/2010/09/should-we-expand-rbas-mandate" target="_blank">here</a> for more matter). By this juncture, the RBA had the experience of 2003 and Greenspan’s purported mistakes prior to the GFC behind it.
Within the RBA, those who advocate a more interventionist approach to influencing asset markets felt vindicated by these events. This cohort included Glenn Stevens, Phil Lowe, Tony Richards and Christopher Kent, among others. The weight of evidence (and logic), they claimed, was inexorably falling behind the “lean against the wind” school of thought – subject to the caveat that this was, of course, but a “policy of least regret”, whatever that means.
On the other side of the Australian debate stood the likes of myself, Dr <a href="https://cis.org.au/publications/policy-monographs/article/906-bubble-poppers-monetary-policy-and-the-myth-of-bubbles-in-asset-prices" target="_blank">Stephen Kirchner</a> of the Centre for Independent Studies, Dr Guy Debelle at the RBA  (see <a href="https://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Twisting-in-the-wind-pd20090522-SA6PF?opendocument&amp;src=rss" target="_blank">his speech</a> to the Brazilian central bank) and Dr David Gruen at Treasury (see <a href="https://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/David-Gruen-spikes-the-bubble-poppers-pd20090618-T53KJ?opendocument&amp;src=rss" target="_blank">here</a>).
The alternative argument was that truly damaging asset price bubbles are hard to identify, that the interest rate changes required to resist one could exact tremendous collateral costs across the wider economy, that a “multiple objective” central bank is more likely to lose focus on its core price stability task, and thus make policy mistakes, and, finally, that there are superior “macro-prudential” tools available to regulators to more surgically cauterise such problems.
An illustration of the latter would be changes to the risk-weights and capital charges that APRA requires banks to hold against commercial and residential property loans. Other examples would be defining minimum equity (i.e., deposit) requirements for new lending (or maximum loan-to-value ratios), minimum debt-servicing standards, and/or the removal of external subsidies, such as the first-home owner’s grant, that distort the market’s functions.
After privately debating this with the likes of Tony Richards at the RBA and watching the central bank in action during 2009 and 2010, I evolved my own view, as I have explained elsewhere.
In short, I could see that a disciplined central bank could, at the margin, tilt the rate at which it adjusted policy in concert with activist jawboning (recall Glenn Stevens’ interview with David Koch reminding folks that property is not a “one-way bet”) to assist in helping the market recalibrate expectations of future capital growth, which, most sensible people acknowledge, can become inflated by decision-making biases inherent in humans.
 
<hr class="system-pagebreak">
 
At the same time, I’ve cautioned that there remain significant risks associated with modifying the conduct of policy in this manner. The RBA has a proven policy regime that has the support of both sides of politics and has been formally documented in agreements between itself and the government.
More pointedly, I’ve argued that it is not up to a non-democratically elected RBA to unilaterally decide that it is going to fundamentally change its mandate, and rationalise this change (as some were prone to doing) by reference to extreme ambiguities in legislation enacted more than 50 years ago.
I encouraged a reluctant RBA to seek explicit support for these new measures from the government and to have this support formally documented in the “statement” executed every few years between the treasurer and the governor. I believe that the 2010 statement accommodates this aim via the insertion of large swathes of new text covering the RBA’s “financial stability” responsibilities and <a href="https://christopherjoye.blogspot.com/2010/10/rba-expands-its-policy-mandate-as-i" target="_blank">by agreeing that RBA instruments can be used to meet these goals</a>.
So today the RBA seems to have more of a mandate to pursue these aspirations. The main risk is that this complicates the challenges policymakers face and boosts the probability of a significant decision-making error. And all central banks, including the RBA, are prone to making mistakes.
RBA officials admit that they lifted interest rates too high in the late 1980s, which gave us “the recession we had to have” and 17% mortgage rates by January 1990. They <a href="https://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Can-the-RBA-target-asset-prices-pd20091215-YQRMP!OpenDocument&amp;Src=rss&amp;Click=" target="_blank">similarly concede</a> that they reduced them too slowly in the years immediately following (the average mortgage rate between 1990 and 1992 was still a stunningly high 13.7%).
RBA officials also accept that they made nontrivial policy missteps in 2006 and 2007 that allowed core inflation in Australia to surge towards an unacceptably high 5% by mid-2008.
The concern here is that a future governor over-tightens policy in response to benign asset price appreciation and sends our interest rate-sensitive economy careening into recession. This could in turn mortally undermine the RBA’s hard-won constituency with the wider community, and its very fragile political independence.
Only time will tell whether we eventually conclude that the hazards associated with using the blunt interest rate instrument to lean against complex asset price changes are too high for policymakers to tolerate.
Christopher Joye is a leading financial economist and a director of Rismark International and Yellow Brick Road Funds Management. The above article is not investment advice.
</body></html>

chrisjoye-JYhJsTrNRC

Significant risks when RBA attempts to burst any housing price bubble: Christopher Joye

<html><body>
Despite much public interest in, and debate around, the major banks’ purported “gouging” and taxpayer-guaranteed status, some very fundamental questions remain, rather bizarrely, unanswered.
These include: what exactly is the major banks’ “cost of funds” that they regularly complain about; how has their overall cost of funds changed (i.e., has it been rising or falling); and if the cost of funds is so obviously important to the banks, and a key determinant of what they can and cannot do with mortgage rates, why don't they simply publish a cost of funds index that tracks any change in it over time?
Yet even a cost of funds index would be inadequate, since it is only one input into the profitability, and overall rates of return, that the major banks target. A more informative benchmark is the major banks’ “net interest margin”, which simply measures the net difference between the interest rates the banks pay on the money they borrow from their funders (e.g., depositors like you and me) and the interest rates they receive on their loans to businesses, households, and SMEs.
By looking at the change in the major banks’ net interest margins, one can get an indication of the profitability of their business activities. Realised profits will, however, be influenced by three further factors: (1) the volume of loans that they write or “credit growth”, which has been in structural decline since the GFC; (2) the extra fees and charges they levy on customers, which yield the banks profits above and beyond their net interest margin; and (3) the banks’ fixed and variable operating costs, the most significant of which is the amount they choose to pay their executives. After accounting for these variables and a few other things, one can get close to calculating the major banks’ “return on equity”, which is a measure of their shareholder earnings.
Regular readers will know that I have been critical of major bank remuneration levels for senior executives, and the banks’ proclivity for hiring former regulators (e.g., Treasury secretaries and RBA governors), which, I have argued, creates dysfunctional long-term incentives between the public and private spheres. Or, in the words of MIT professor, Simon Johnson, a financial “oligarchy”.
According to CBA’s 2011 Remuneration Report, the average total compensation of the top 15 executives was an incredible $4.5 million (the median was only slightly lower). Excluding CEO Ralph Norris, the average compensation was still $4.2 million (see table below).
<img src="/images/stories/cbachart.gif">
These numbers highlight the absurdity of attacks of the RBA governor’s comparatively paltry $1 million pay, especially given he is responsible for overseeing the entire banking system (in concert with APRA), and, more pointedly, bailing out Australian banks facing funding crises via the RBA’s liquidity facilities. And this all in addition to the RBA’s first-order monetary policy functions.
Reasonable criticisms of major bank pay can also be made on the basis that they are effectively quasi-public (i.e., non-private) institutions that implicitly and explicitly rely very heavily on taxpayer subsidies in the form of free taxpayer guarantees of bank deposits, subsidised taxpayer guarantees of bank debts, and the RBA’s many and varied forms of low-cost liquidity support. Ask yourself: what other private companies get the benefit of all this taxpayer largesse?
According to the RBA, the major banks’ average net interest margin (or NIM) was 2.4% per annum as at September 2011. But this is merely a single point estimate.  How does this margin compare with its pre-GFC levels? In the chart below I have illustrated UBS’s estimate of the major banks’ average net interest margin since the beginning of 2004.
Click to enlarge
<a title="Click to enlarge" rel="shadowbox" href="/images/stories/jan102.gif"><img src="/images/stories/jan102thumb.gif"></a>
We can draw two insights from this analysis. The first is that the major banks’ net interest margins have been steadily increasing since the low of 2.06% reached during the first half of 2008. The second is that notwithstanding the banks’ much higher cost of funds and the introduction of a raft of taxpayer support schemes, the margins they are earning today are as good as they have been since the second half of 2004.
As noted above, net interest margins are only one part of the banks’ complex profitability picture. Several years ago I censured the RBA for focussing on this proxy to the neglect of more complete benchmarks, such as return on equity (RoE). The RBA now regularly reports and parses bank RoEs in its bi-annual Financial Stability Review.
So how has bank profitability varied over time? And has there been a decline in bank returns post-GFC in recognition of their lower risks as a function of (1) higher internal capital requirements (i.e., less leverage) and (2) the fact that as explicitly taxpayer-backed institutions there is demonstrably less of a need to produce ultra-high growth in order to raise capital?
In my final chart I have depicted UBS’s estimate of the average major bank return on equity (profit-weighted) since 1993. Remarkably, the major banks were able to maintain solid double-digit RoEs during the global credit crisis experienced in 2007-09 (and since). Today, the average RoE remains a still very high 17%, and, abstracting away from some circa 20% spikes, is not materially different to the levels observed in the 10 to 15 years before the GFC. Indeed, this crisis was evidently a good one for Australian banks, since they were able to keep their returns way above the lows observed during the 1991 recession.
Click to enlarge
<a title="Click to enlarge" rel="shadowbox" href="/images/stories/jan103.gif"><img src="/images/stories/jan103thumb.gif"></a>
We have, therefore, yet to see a structural decline in RoEs commensurate with the much lower risk profile of these utilities. And there can be little debate about the latter claim. The world’s largest rating agency, Standard &amp; Poor’s, concluded in a review of the banks in <a href="https://www.propertyobserver.com.au/economy/major-banks-play-down-sp-ratings-downgrade/2011120252649">December that their credit rating is two notches higher, and hence their cost of funds lower</a>, because of the assumption that they are government guaranteed. Specifically, S&amp;P remarked, “Our counterparty credit rating on Commonwealth Bank is two notches higher than the [stand-alone credit rating], reflecting our view of a high likelihood of extraordinary government support in a crisis.”
A closing thought is that the major banks have ample room to absorb higher funding costs. That is, they should be prepared to deliver shareholders lower returns, and operate on the basis of somewhat thinner net interest margins, given the advent of public guarantees of their livelihood and solvency has unambiguously improved shareholders’ risk-return trade-off.
Christopher Joye is a leading financial economist and a director of Rismark International and Yellow Brick Road Funds Management. The above article is not investment advice.
</body></html>

Lower risks mean lower bank returns: Christopher Joye

<html><body>
It’s that time again.  We are all inevitably turning our minds to what may materialise over the 2012 horizon. The market for predictions is – nay, has always been – characterised by very high demand. And countless so-called "experts" seek to supply it.
Forecasting the future is, however, an exceedingly difficult game, and, in some respects, far more challenging than making money. I explained why <a href="https://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/markets-economists-traders-interest-rates-invest-pd20111117-NNVW4?OpenDocument&amp;src=sph" target="_blank">here</a>. The Reserve Bank has such little faith in its forecasting ability that it prefers to spend more time engaged in what Glenn Stevens’ recently described as "nowcasting". That is, forget the future – let’s try to work out what is actually happening in the present. I find that it’s useful to reflect on the past. Who got it right. Who got it wrong. And why… The best calls of 2011 – Anyone who anticipated the extraordinary increase in eurozone sovereign yields, the spectre of the collapse of the eurozone itself and the dire knock-on effects across global debt markets, including <country-region><place>Australia</place></country-region>’s. Judging from the dismal performance of global macro hedge funds, which recruit the best and brightest geopolitical minds but were, on average, down 3.65% in 2011, few really got this one right. – Anyone who expected the equally remarkable rise in the value of Australian government bonds to record levels as global central banks diversified away from the traditional reserve currencies – such as the US dollar, Swiss franc, and yen – in order to get access to one of the least risky, yet highest yielding, AAA credits (ie, Australia). – The four major banks, which convinced Standard &amp; Poor’s that their taxpayer-backed, ‘too big to fail’ status warranted a credit rating that was two notches higher than it would otherwise be, because they are able to rely on a ‘lender of last resort’ (ie, taxpayers) during an emergency. Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, anyone? To<a target="_blank" href="https://christopherjoye.blogspot.com/2011/12/standard-poors-major-banks-have-lower"> quote</a> Standard &amp; Poor’s, “Our counterparty credit rating on Commonwealth Bank is two notches higher than the [stand-alone credit rating], reflecting our view of a high likelihood of extraordinary government support in a crisis. This reflects our view of CBA's high systemic importance in <country-region><place>Australia</place></country-region>, and our assessment of the Australian government as highly supportive of institutions core to the national economy.” But bad luck if you are a smaller regional bank, like the Bank of Queensland, which Standard &amp; Poor’s assumed (incorrectly in my mind) would not receive the same taxpayer support. Recent history suggests otherwise. – Fairfax’s new chief executive, Greg Hywood, who finally bit the bullet, and embraced my manifesto – published by the ABC in this<a target="_blank" href="https://www.propertyobserver.com.au/https://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/43774"> op-ed</a> – on how to revitalise the chronically underperforming Australian Financial Review. A critical part of this plan was the appointment of a new leadership team in the form of young whippersnapper, Brett Clegg, and the leviathan of the hard right, Michael Stutchbury. – Anyone who went long ‘volatility’. In December 2010 I wrote a column claiming that our ‘new normal’ would be one characterised by far less predictable monetary policy. Specifically, I<a target="_blank" href="https://christopherjoye.blogspot.com/2010/12/volatility-is-good-thing"> argued</a>, “Australia’s economic destiny over the next 10-20 years is likely to be much more uncertain and volatile than it has been in the last two decades… One consequence of Australia’s heightened uncertainty will be that the two major levers of economic management, monetary and fiscal policy, will become more complex to set, and thus more difficult for investors to anticipate. Such uncertainty also engenders opportunity. Investors will probably face a wider distribution of potential outcomes, and thus more chances to make or lose money depending on their ability to divine our economic destiny.” And so it proved true. At the start of 2011 no Australian economist was forecasting that the RBA would cut rates twice. Ironically, some of the most hawkish economists this time last year are amongst the most vocally dovish today.  – The private European banks that persuaded the ECB to give them a new three-year term funding facility at a low 1% interest rate. As soon as the facility was available, European banks immediately borrowed €489 billion from the ECB. In effect, European taxpayers are stepping into the breach left by private capital markets and directly funding their own wobbly banks via magic money (ie, the ECB’s printing press). The genius behind the ECB initiative is that it opens up a near riskless ‘carry trade’ to European banks, whereby they can borrow for up to three years at 1% and immediately reinvest that money in eurozone government bonds yielding between 2-6% per annum. This satisfies both the banks’ ‘liquid asset’ requirements under Basel III and European governments’ desire to stimulate demand for their liabilities. – Again, credit must go to Australia’s four major banks, which, having astutely retained the services of one former RBA governor and two former Treasury Secretaries (and RBA board members), managed to convince APRA, the RBA, and Treasury to lobby furiously on their behalf for exemption from holding the extra capital required of the world’s 30 largest banks, which Australia’s majors all rank amongst, under Basel III. The only explanation local regulators could offer their overseas contemporaries was that they were not systematically important global institutions because they have no significant overseas exposures (with a wink and a nudge to Mike Smith and ANZ’s pan-Asian expansion plans). – Kudos also to the four majors, for persuading APRA, the Treasury and the RBA to permit them to be exempted from the standard ‘liquid asset’ test that will apply to all other global banks under Basel III. Instead, <country-region><place>Australia</place></country-region>’s banks will have the unique benefit of a direct ‘line-of-credit’ from taxpayers, which they can tap during any emergency. Specifically, the RBA is supplying them with a new ‘Committed Liquidity Facility’ (instead of the standard Basel III requirement of holding sovereign debt), which for a tiny cost of 0.15% per annum local banks will be able draw on if they face a funding crisis. – Of course Westpac’s Bill Evans, who pulled off the forecasting coup of the year. On the July 15, Evans turned 180 degrees from projecting further RBA rate hikes to a total of four cuts, commencing in December. It is one indication of how difficult forecasting really is that while Evan’s switch is universally hailed as highly prescient, the timing and magnitude of the forecast itself were wide of the mark. (In the article <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/markets-economists-traders-interest-rates-invest-pd20111117-NNVW4?OpenDocument">Fighting a false forecasting war</a>, published November 17, I explained the poorly understood differences between forecasting and investing.<a href="https://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/markets-economists-traders-interest-rates-invest-pd20111117-NNVW4?OpenDocument&amp;src=sph"></a>) Immediately after Evans’ radical change of tune, which was triggered by an overseas trip, the second quarter inflation numbers printed at a stonkingly high 0.9% (after a similarly high first quarter result). Were it not for the <country-region><place>US</place></country-region> debt ceiling crisis, the RBA would have hiked rates in August. Instead, the RBA ended up lowering rates in November and December. The first cut was rationalised by the RBA’s willingness to shift monetary policy back to ‘neutral’ on the basis of the one (anomalously low) third-quarter CPI print. The December cut, which tipped policy into stimulatory territory, was justified not by a weak domestic economy, which the RBA repeatedly claimed was tracking ‘at trend’, but rather by the desire to give financial markets some insurance against a deterioration in the European situation.  – Anyone who had the foresight to express concerns about the durability of the ‘independent’ central banking and inflation-targeting models that had prevailed for 15-20 years prior to the GFC, and, more particularly, voice apprehension about the likelihood that sovereign states would seek to politicise (or ‘fiscalise’) their central banks by compelling them to monetise government debts. The RBA is, for the time being, one of the last remaining examples of a nearly extinct species.  – Anyone who acted on Rismark's now fashionable yet long-standing portfolio construction advice of reducing exposures to listed Australian and global equities, and increasing portfolio weights to Australian government bonds and cash. Over 2011 the Australian sharemarket, including the reinvestment of dividends, declined by about 15%. In comparison, the UBS Composite Bond Index, which proxies for the broad Australian fixed-income market, rose by a stunning 11% while bank bills returned over 5%. – Those economists who held firm on their optimistic economic and household income growth forecasts in the face of numerous 2011 storms. In the second and third quarters of 2011, real GDP growth has averaged a way-above-trend 4.8% (annualised). And the flood-affected fourth quarter of 2010 has been consistently revised up, with real GDP growth now estimated to have been a trend-like 0.8% even with a 0.5% drag attributed by Treasury to natural disasters. Real per capita disposable income has been similar impressive, expanding at an 8.8% annualised pace over the six months to September. – Anyone who rejected the relentless lobbying by vested commercial interests and those pushing doomsday scenarios about the so-called ‘retail recession’ and weak consumer spending. It turns out that Australian consumer spending has been rising at a healthy rate. Based on the latest ABS national accounts data, consumer spending averaged 4.4% over the half-year to September, and 3.7% over the past 12 months. The RBA has noted that consumer spending, which is the single largest driver of economic growth, has merely substituted towards services and away from traditional retail goods. The chart below shows the quarterly pace of Australian consumer spending in real terms, which is currently expanding at a rate well-above its long-term average since the end of 1989.
<img src="/images/stories/joyeabs.gif">
– Rismark’s September 2010 forecast for ‘modest’ declines in Australian house prices if the RBA lifted rates – we got a double hike in November 2010 – combined with ‘de facto’ hikes in 2011 care of extreme consumer hawkishness (documented in numerous surveys) with the average family budgeting for two to three rate increases. Over the first 11 months of 2011, Australian capital city dwelling prices only fell by 2.8% (in actual raw terms), and by 3.7% on a seasonally-adjusted basis. The November house price data released on December 30 shows the first actual rise in both capital city and regional dwelling prices since December 2010. – The pioneering use of animated cartoons to spoof the decision-making of the RBA and <country-region><place>Australia</place></country-region>’s major bank oligopoly. To date, there have been over 5,500 unique views of these cartoons, which average over five minutes each. By far the most popular has been <a href="https://www.xtranormal.com/watch/12784379/leaked-secret-video-of-two-major-bank-ceos-chat">this skit</a> of a dialogue between Westpac’s Gail Kelly and NAB’s Cameron Clyne.
Next page: The worst calls of 2011
 
<hr class="system-pagebreak">
 The worst calls of 2011 – Wayne Swan’s unprecedented decision to break with 20 plus years of convention and take the pay-setting powers away from the RBA’s independent board members, led by the highly-respected Jillian Broadbent, and put them under the government’s control. Prior to doing this, Broadbent wrote to Swan, <a href="https://christopherjoye.blogspot.com/2011/09/knee-capping-aussie-central-banks">arguing</a> "[C]hanging current responsibilities on remuneration would jeopardise the calibre of the Reserve Bank officers and the bank's high standing...The board believes that the current remuneration framework for the bank is crucial to the bank's continuing capacity to carry out its duties to the standards required, and would see any move to unwind it as undermining the capacity of the Bank to do so." Swan’s complaint was that Glenn Stevens gets paid too much – that is, one-fifth what the average top 12 executives at a major bank receives. – Muammar Gaddafi’s decision to knock back the opportunity to go into exile in Venezuala, Zimbabwe, Angola, Burkina Faso, Chad, or Equatorial Guinea. Likewise, the decision of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak to resist his Arab Spring. The smarty-pants in the Middle East looks to have been <country-region>Tunisia</country-region>’s former president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who simply relocated to <country-region><place>Saudi Arabia</place></country-region>. – The chorus of commentators and analysts who claimed the major banks would not be able to pass on the RBA’s December rate cut in full because of higher funding costs. – The consensus economist projection at the start of 2011, which yours truly subscribed to, that the RBA would raise rates several times over the year on the back of high core inflation. We got the high core inflation in the first six months, but a conflictingly low print in the third quarter. The RBA showed us that it finds lifting rates into restrictive territory hard work, while cutting them on the back of more mixed evidence seems to be an easier decision. This could be related to the fact that the RBA board is dominated, unusually, by six political appointees from the private sector plus a government representative in the form of the Treasury Secretary. Read about how the RBA’s decision-making process really works <a href="https://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Dont-expect-the-unexpected-from-this-RBA-pd20111207-PAU9M?OpenDocument&amp;emcontent_spectators">here</a>. – Doomsayers who confidently claimed that the eurozone was certain to collapse. (This may yet prove true!) – News Ltd’s Terry McCrann, who called a certain hike in August 2011, and the AFR’s Alan Mitchell, who argued the RBA would not cut in December unless there was a demonstrable deterioration in European conditions. – Bill Gross’s decision to sell PIMCO’s holdings of US Treasuries on the basis that money printing by the Federal Reserve (hit) would stimulate inflation pressures (hit) and a decline in the perceived creditworthiness of the US sovereign (hit with Standard &amp; Poor’s dutifully downgrading the US to a AA rating), and the resulting surge in US yields (miss) forcing a decline in the value of US bonds (miss). Gross arguably underestimated the power of risk-aversion. – The Commonwealth Treasury’s 2011-12 budget deficit forecast, which after only six or seven months had to be revised up by another $14.5 billion (between the May budget and the November MYEFO). – Steve Keen’s mid 2010 prediction of ‘accelerating’ declines in Australian house prices, which have fallen by less than 3% and look to be decelerating based on today’s data. – The droves of sharemarket spruikers who once again forecast stunning gains for Australian equities. While they are too many in number to list here, representative examples include AMP and UBS’s calls for the ASX 200 to rise to 5,500 and 5,600 points, respectively, by end 2011 (ie, gains of circa 20% before accounting for dividends). Today the bourse is sitting near 4,000 points. – Finally, the oft-quoted interest rate futures market, which at various times during the year has predicted more than one RBA hike and five RBA cuts. Of course, we got neither. As I explained in<a href="https://christopherjoye.blogspot.com/2011/10/financial-markets-pricing-of-rba-rate" target="_blank"> this column</a>, market pricing for future RBA rate changes is both highly volatile, and biased by various influences. While economists get panned for changing their views, the truth is that market is far more temperamental.
 
Click to enlarge
<a href="/images/stories/joyedec6.gif" rel="shadowbox" title="Click to enlarge"><img src="/images/stories/joyedec6thumb.gif"></a>
Christopher Joye is a leading financial economist and a director of Rismark International and Yellow Brick Road Funds Management. The above article is not investment advice.
This article originally appeared on <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessspectator.com.au/">Business Spectator</a>. 
 
 
</body></html>

Best and worst calls for 2011: Christopher Joye

<html><body>
There is an enormous amount of time wasted debating whether Australian house prices are over- or under-valued. The vast bulk of everything that is written on this subject is, unfortunately, both factually flawed and misleading. 
Today I want to objectively eviscerate the long-standing myth that the Australian housing market is in the throes of an unsustainable bubble using two very simple charts, which you are unlikely to have seen before. 
By referencing this analysis alone one can conclude that current Australian house prices are comfortably explained by fundamental economic factors. That is, there is no evidence that domestic housing costs have overshot basic measures of fair value. We will also see that the average Australian family’s disposable income after meeting all housing costs is actually higher than it has been at any time since our analysis begins in 1985. 
The first question we address is most powerful in its simplicity. Specifically, we want to work out how much of the growth in Australian house prices since 1985 can be explained by changes in disposable household incomes and mortgage rates. 
Regular readers will recall that both the RBA and I have regularly argued that the increase in household debt-to-income ratios, which started during the early 1990s, and the coincident rise in Australia’s dwelling price-to-disposable income ratio, can be partly attributed to the circa 40% reduction in average mortgage rates between the 1980 and 1995, on the one hand, and 1995 and today, on the other. These two periods book-end the introduction of the RBA’s “inflation-targeting” regime, which helped lock-in consumer price growth of 2% to 3% per annum, and thus much lower nominal interest rates. More formally, mortgage rates averaged 12.6% between 1980 and 1995. Since that time, mortgage rates have averaged a little less than 7.5%. 
In our first chart below Rismark’s research group has put this hypothesis to the test. In particular, we take the median Australian dwelling price in June 1985 and “index” this by only two variables: (1) changes in incomes; and (2) changes in borrowing capacity enabled by variations in mortgage rates over time (assuming that the household’s loan-to-value ratio and mortgage repayments-to-disposable income ratio stay constant in 1985 terms). 
The final income- and interest rate-adjusted 1985 median dwelling price is denoted by the blue line in the chart below. The red line represents actual median prices. 
To get the best possible measure of the change in household earnings, we use the ABS’s disposable household income series, which is reported as part of the National Accounts. We have not used the gross increase in disposable household income, since this is artificially inflated by population growth. To control for the latter, we divide disposable household incomes by the number of households each quarter. This gives us disposable income on a per household basis, which expands at a lower rate than the headline disposable income series. 
If we simply index the 1985 median dwelling price by this measure of incomes, we can account for 60.1% of the total increase in Australian housing costs over the last 26 years.
Click to enlarge
<a title="Click to enlarge" rel="shadowbox" href="/images/stories/december201.gif"><img src="/images/stories/december201thumb.gif"></a>
As discussed, the second variable we use to adjust the 1985 median dwelling price is the change in household borrowing capacity over time. To properly quantify this, we keep the amount of money households spend on their mortgage repayments constant. That is, we fix the 1985 mortgage repayments-to-disposable income ratio and apply this fixed ratio to the entire 1985 to 2011 time-series. 
We do not, therefore, allow households to spend any more of their earnings on meeting housing costs over time. We also assume a constant mortgage loan-to-property value ratio. Accordingly, the only variable that influences the household’s borrowing capacity is fluctuations in mortgage rates over time, which we source from the RBA. 
Adding changes in borrowing capacity to the blue line in our chart above, we can explain a further 31.9% of the increase in Australian housing costs since 1985. 
Collectively, incomes and interest rates account for 92% of the increase in median Australian dwelling prices over the period 1985 to 2011. 
Note that since the average size of Australian homes has tended to rise, it is likely that there are some “compositional biases” affecting our median measure of housing costs (i.e., the red line in the chart above). That is, it is conceivable that incomes and mortgage rates actually account for an even higher share of the time-series change in dwelling prices than our analysis suggests. 
Our second chart takes a novel look at the question of housing affordability. This analysis actually borrows from an approach first developed by Dr Tony Richards at the RBA. Specifically, it asks the question: how much real disposable do households have left over after buying the representative home and servicing all their mortgage costs? 
In order to compare the welfare of different households over time, we take the disposable income measure used in the first chart above every quarter and assume the household buys the median-priced dwelling as recorded in that same quarter. Given a fixed loan-to-value ratio, we then work out the principal and interest repayments owing on the household’s mortgage, which it meets out of its income. After adjusting for inflation we have a quarterly estimate of real disposable income per household netting out all housing costs (i.e., after buying a home and servicing the mortgage). This is represented by the blue line in the chart below.
Click to enlarge
<a title="Click to enlarge" rel="shadowbox" href="/images/stories/december202.gif"><img src="/images/stories/december202thumb.gif"></a>
It turns out that in 2011 Australian households actually have more income left over after purchasing the dwelling of their dreams and meeting their principal and interest repayments than any of their predecessors since our analysis begins in June 1985. This was exactly the same result that Richards found when he first published his work in early 2008. On the basis of this benchmark, housing affordability in Australia has never been better.
In closing today’s column, I want to provide an update to our closely followed dwelling price-to-income ratio. We have recalculated this data to reflect the ABS’s September National Accounts. The key conclusion is, as we have predicted for some time, that Australia’s dwelling price-to-income ratio continues to slowly decline to around four times, which also accords with what the RBA finds.
While one can quibble about exactly what the ABS includes in its measure of disposable incomes, we are more concerned about changes in the ratio over time (rather than the specific levels). And when focussing on how the ratio has moved, we can clearly see that there is no evidence that Australian housing costs have grown more rapidly than disposable household incomes over the last seven to eight years. In fact, when we use a much more precise measure of housing costs — namely, our hedonic indices – we find that per capita incomes in Australia have actually outpaced national dwelling prices by about 15% since the end of 2003.
Click to enlarge
<a title="Click to enlarge" rel="shadowbox" href="/images/stories/december204.gif"><img src="/images/stories/december204thumb.gif"></a>
In a recent report, the ratings agency Moody’s downgraded its outlook for Australia’s mortgage insurance sector almost exclusively on the basis of concerns about Australia’s housing market. On the one hand, Moody’s argued that, “elevated house prices and mortgage debt levels are arguably at unsustainable levels and remain a key vulnerability for the LMI industry.” Yet in the same report they concede that “our view is that the data on the sustainability of Australian housing prices remain ambiguous.” While these two statements are difficult to reconcile, we hope that the evidence presented above will help clarify Moody’s views.
 Christopher Joye is a leading financial economist and a director of Rismark International and Yellow Brick Road Funds Management. The above article is not investment advice.
</body></html>

The final word on Australian house prices: Christopher Joye

<html><body>
Yesterday we read Paul Sheehan in the Sydney Morning Herald <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/four-pillars-bashed-but-holding-firm-20111211-1opk5" target="_blank">arguing</a> that Australia’s major banks “look like ports in a storm”, and were prudent in hesitating to pass on the RBA’s cuts. 
Sheehan claims that “reflexive calls for our banks to pass on the Reserve Bank's interest rate cuts, in full, are now double-edged… A healthy bank is far preferable than a stressed bank. They may need their fat for harder times.” 
In case you missed it, his op-ed’s title conveyed the message even more crisply: “Our banks aren't so greedy after all." 
Sheehan was accompanied by a second SMH piece, ironically produced by an economic consultant to the banks, which <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/business/no-need-for-banks-to-pass-the-cut-20111212-1oqv4" target="_blank">posited</a> that we should, in fact, only ever expect the banks to pass on 80% of any RBA move. Again, the article’s pithy title told you all you needed to know: “No need for banks to pass the cut.” 
Sheehan’s insinuation that we should prioritise major bank profitability over competitive considerations is not novel. He is merely trotting out the very standard RBA and Australian Bankers Association (ABA) line on the purported trade-off between “financial stability” and “competition”. The two are supposedly mutually exclusive, which necessitates a more concentrated financial system. Privately, serious policy thinkers know that both the RBA and APRA would prefer fewer banks to regulate rather than more. 
To this line of logic, more competition means lower margins, which means less profitable and hence less “stable” institutions. It’s that crude. And it's wrong. 
Sheehan would have almost certainly been worded up by someone in the RBA- Treasury-ABA-major bank network to present the “other side” of the bank bashing story. 
Oh, and rest assured, this is an “insiders' network”, much like the “financial oligarchy” that MIT’s Simon Johnson famously identified as the source of so many problems in the US. 
A former head of Treasury and director of the RBA, Ted Evans, is chairman of Westpac. 
His successor as head of Treasury and a director of the RBA, Ken Henry, has just been appointed to NAB’s board. 
The governor of the RBA between 1996 and 2007, Ian MacFarlane, joined ANZ's board once his term at the RBA expired. 
David Morgan, a long-time Treasury official who rose to become 2iC, left to join Westpac, which he led as CEO during the 1990s and 2000s. 
Another former RBA official, Andrew Mohl, was until recently chief executive of AMP. 
And I fully expect the outgoing deputy governor of the RBA, who was well-known as a defender of the banking oligopoly, to end up on some bank board. 
If during your career as a (relatively) lowly paid regulator or public servant you have one eye on a lucrative banking job to secure your retirement nest egg, it’s hard to believe that this does not in some way contaminate your ability to exercise independence. 
The Washington-Wall Street-like crossover between Australian banks and the bureaucracy may be one reason why domestic regulators have been so keen to protect the majors from the reforms their peers overseas are being subject to following the GFC. 
After all, according to the local oligarchy’s narrative, luck had little role to play in Australia’s success in skirting the crisis. It had nothing to do with our leverage to Asia, extraordinary endowments of resources, high population growth, 20 years of rising real GDP, or the fact that our banks had not expanded overseas due to their focus on servicing the high growth domestic economy. 
In Sheehan’s words, “we can thank good government policy and good banking.” No sight of providence in this play!
 
This may explain why the RBA has been pushing hard to have the major banks exempted from the extra capital charge that the world’s 30 largest banks will be hit with under BASEL III, even though the majors rank among this list. 
The argument goes that Australia’s banks don’t have significant overseas exposures. But is it not the explicit corporate strategy of the CEOs of two of the four majors to expand into foreign territories? Of course it is. We’ve even had the newly appointed CEO of the Bank of Queensland claim that Australian banks should use their (taxpayer-underwritten) pricing power to buy cheap assets overseas. 
The dysfunctional regulatory-banking nexus is also possibly one reason why our banks have been exempted from holding the standard “liquid assets” that all other global banks will be required to keep. The official explanation was Australia has little government debt to satisfy this requirement. 
Yet Australia’s unique solution involved the RBA offering all banks a so-called “Committed Liquidity Facility”, which for a cost of just 0.15% per annum will give banks an immediate line of credit whenever they face funding stress. That is, they can swap illiquid assets with the RBA for cash and thus directly cauterise their solvency concerns. 
One of the reasons I have argued consistently for better pay in the public sector is so that officials feel less need to leave and seek lucrative private sector gigs. (And officials do use this explanation when asked why they are taking on such jobs.) 
The financial stability/competition trade-off that guides so much banking policy thinking in Australia is actually a sham. To demonstrate why, I put to you this idea. 
The four major banks’ combined market capitalisation is an extraordinary $250 billion (that’s about 20% of the national GDP). 
Imagine, for a moment, if we could replace the majors with, say, a larger number of smaller institutions. That is, if we took this quarter of a trillion dollars and spread it across, say, 10 smaller, safer banks – with no offshore expansion plans, with no “non-core” banking activities – worth, say, $20 billion to 30 billion each. Think of 10 different versions of Bendigo and Adelaide Bank. 
Our financial system would no longer have four “too-big-to-fail” legs, and all of the long-term moral hazard problems that these government-guaranteed institutions engender. Instead, it would have 10 smaller pins across which to apportion the economy’s risk. This is just smart diversification. 
How might one achieve this? You could begin by introducing a financial transactions tax that became much more punitive as an institution’s size – measured by its assets as a share of the system’s total assets – rose beyond a certain, unacceptably high threshold. 
You would basically be signalling that if you want to become a mega, too-big-to-fail bank, you are going to have to pay taxpayers a hefty price for the explicit and implicit catastrophe insurance. 
And if you think I am being melodramatic about taxpayers bailing out banks, I would encourage you to refer to Standard and Poor’s independent perspective. In assessing the creditworthiness of the major banks this month, Standard and Poor’s commented that their funding costs were substantially lower because of the assumption of taxpayer support. Specifically: 
 “Our counterparty credit rating on CBA is two notches higher than the [stand-alone credit rating], reflecting our view of a high likelihood of extraordinary government support in a crisis. This reflects our view of CBA's high systemic importance in Australia, and our assessment of the Australian government as highly supportive of institutions core to the national economy." 
And if you want a lighter take on everything I have argued today, have a glance at this online <a href="https://www.xtranormal.com/watch/12784379/leaked-secret-video-of-two-major-bank-ceos-chat">cartoon skit between two of the big banks CEOs</a>.
Christopher Joye is a leading financial economist and a director of Rismark International and Yellow Brick Road Funds Management. The above article is not investment advice.
</body></html>

Bashing the banks is A-OK: Christopher Joye

<html><body>
The ABS housing finance data released today has once again reaffirmed what I have argued here for months now: Australia's housing market is stabilising, and would likely have commenced a gradual recovery in the absence of interest rate accommodation from our recently appointed major bank insurer, aka the RBA.
Today the ABS reports that in the month of October – before the November or December rate cuts, which have been passed on to borrowers mostly unperturbed – the number of new home loans approved to people buying existing dwellings had once again risen by a very healthy 0.9% month-on-month.
Indeed, the number of new home loans approved by Australian lenders for purchases in October – not “refinancings” – was higher than any other month since way back in 2009. You can see the very steady ramp-up in seasonally adjusted new home loan approvals in my chart below.
<img src="https://www.urban.com.au/images/stories/december12.gif">
Now for some reason analysts get confused when interpreting this housing finance data. In respect of the future performance of the housing market, we don't care much for purchases of newly developed homes, which are a small fraction (circa 5%) of the total, refinancings of existing loans, the share of owner-occupiers versus buyers, nor the 'value' of loans (where the latter is affected by a range of things including the value of the homes being purchased, the types of buyers in the market – e.g., first timers acquiring cheaper homes – and the policies of lenders).
The single best proxy for the demand-side of the housing market is the seasonally adjusted number of new loans approved for the purchase of existing homes, which is about 20 times the size of the “new dwellings” series.
Since April 2011, this benchmark has been growing healthily, averaging a stonking 2.2% increase each month. Let me reiterate, this was before two consecutive RBA rate cuts that have been passed on to borrowers.
We got the first glimpse of the impact the RBA's very generous policy reversal has had on the housing market via <a href="https://www.propertyobserver.com.au/mortgages/afg-mortgage-approvals-at-33-month-high-as-investors-return-to-the-market" target="_blank">AFG's data for November</a> (AFG is Australia's largest mortgage broker). This series, which leads the ABS numbers, printed at its highest level since March 2009, with investors hitting their biggest relative share in history.
Expect much more of this in 2012 as Australians seek to take advantage of sub-6% fixed-rate home loans and discounted variable rates only slightly above this level.
As I have noted too many times to count, our incredibly interest rate sensitive housing sector (which is much more so than it has been in decades past) will likely prove a very powerful hedge against adversity in the event that the RBA slashes rates. In contrast to other countries, almost all of Australia's residential borrowers are on fully adjustable-rate mortgages that typically price off the RBA's cash rate.
Why? Because circa 60% of bank funding comes from short-term retail deposits, which in turn price off the short-end of the yield curve largely controlled by the RBA. But I will leave bank funding costs for a column on another day!
Christopher Joye is a leading financial economist and a director of Rismark International and Yellow Brick Road Funds Management. The above article is not investment advice.
</body></html>

 Housing market recovered strongly in October 

<html><body>
So David Bassanese from the AFR reminded me that he called the RBA's rate cut yesterday. I don't think anyone else in media land really picked it. The market was fully pricing it – had been since the last meeting. Stephen Koukoulas (aka "Koukie") was there three or four months ago – but he was also confident about the RBA cutting 25 basis points in October and 50 basis points in November, at various times. 
Bill Evans at Westpac, Brian Redican at Macquarie, and Tim Toohey at Goldman have been brilliant at anticipating this sharp turn-around in the RBA's monetary policy stance. One question is whether they picked it for the right reasons. If you were dovish because of the domestic economy, you were right for the wrong reasons. If you were dovish because of low inflation, well, I don't know what to say. We've had two high core inflation numbers in quarter one and quarter two (after multiple revisions) and one low result in quarter three (first estimate). Nobody is much good at forecasting inflation one to two quarters ahead. Almost all economists struggle to predict core inflation the day before the release. But if you were punting on low inflation as a driver of the RBA's 180-degree turn, you surely deserve some credit. 
If, on the other hand, you were motivated by the offshore environment, and Europe and the US, in particular, well, hats off to you. Bill Evans and probably Toohey fall into this category. Koukie I suspect too. Matty Johnson at UBS is another who fingered it early, and who was quick to call a European recession. He was confident about a December cut many weeks ago. 
Bassanese's rationale derived from the "insurance" (or "put option") school of thought. That argument was an obvious one, but I was not convinced the RBA would necessarily acquiesce. I was 50:50 right up to the decision. Anyone claiming December was certain has probably got the last few months wrong. A good counterfactual is HSBC's Paul Bloxham. Blocker spent 11 years working under Stevens, Richards and Lowe in the RBA's economic analysis department. He only left there a year or so ago. Unfortunately, Paul has missed November and December. He's now switched his position and is calling a spate of cuts. 
One of the smartest and most successful rate participants I know characterised it as a coin toss a day or two ago. There was a lot of money to be made going short interest rate futures if you had conviction about the RBA keeping its finger off the trigger. Right up to 2.30pm I was trying to clear a position in my head. I could not – I had this uneasy feeling, a little like I did right before the August decision to pause. One clear thought did come into my mind: “Whatever the RBA does today we will learn more about the way board members think. And that really is the key take-away.” 
You hear a lot of baloney from media commentators and economists who talk to the RBA and tell you – even to this day – that the RBA completely controls its own board and is at one with all its decisions. Anyone who says that is trotting out the house line. Of course the RBA wants everyone to think its relationship with the board is always harmonious, and decision-making is always unanimous. But anyone who has sat on corporate boards knows that is not how they work. 
We know that some RBA board members wanted interest rates lower in the first half of 2011, and we know, again as a matter of absolute fact, that some were calling for higher rates. We obviously got neither. 
What we saw yesterday, and what we have seen in 2011, is a classic committee-based decision-making framework. I know from years of personal experience that as soon as you run a decision-making process through a committee larger than two or three people, especially within a risk-averse or bureaucratic organisation, you get lowest-common-denominator solutions. You get “easy” decisions that are straightforward to justify. 
Super funds are a classic example: do what everybody else is doing. If everyone is over-invested in equities and underweight cash and fixed-income, do the same. Pick up the pieces after the event only when everyone else is doing the same. You can never be criticised if you are one man concealed by a crowd. 
That's what we've witnessed this year. The RBA's board comprises nine relatively ordinary individuals. We have learnt that they find it, unsurprisingly, very hard to make tough decisions. Everyone who has worked with the RBA will tell you that raising rates is hard work. We saw that in the first seven months of 2011. There were at least three months when a bolder, braver and more independent decision-making framework could have hiked. Would that have been a mistake? Of course not. If you hiked once earlier in the year (e.g., in May or June when a tightening was on the table) you would be claiming credit for the low inflation print in quarter three. You would have had much more justification for easing policy in November given the disturbing developments offshore and the supposedly altered inflation outlook. 
Instead, we found the RBA could not muster the fortitude to hike. The board dithered through the first seven decisions of the year, as you would expect any nine person committee chock-a-block full of strong personalities to do. They consistently sent highly inconsistent signals to the market. 
We know that because the economists covering the RBA were saying point-blank that they were confused by its conflicting statements. The first two Statements on Monetary Policy were incredibly hawkish while the Board Statements seemed more dovish. Is that really a surprise when one is prepared by the staff and the other by a committee? Sorry guys, they are not all joined-at-the-hip. 
 
<hr class="system-pagebreak">
 
Even the media folks speaking directly to senior members of the bank, such as Terry McCrann in late July, and, this month, Alan Mitchell, were calling it wrong. After the November meeting Mitchell was telling us in column after column that only a major deepening of the crisis in Europe would force the RBA to cut in December. 
Mitchell and his Fairfax colleague, Peter Martin, confidently declared that November was a “once-off” adjustment of the cash rate back to neutral. Don't bank on any Christmas gifts from the hard-headed RBA. Don't expect the RBA to cut rates because of the mini-budget. 
Well, nothing has really changed in Europe. In fact, bond yields plummeted right before the decision yesterday with the Sarkozy-Merkel plan afoot. The domestic data flow was fine. There are some very early indications the highly interest rate sensitive housing market could be about to bounce back strongly with Australia's largest mortgage broker, AFG, reporting its single biggest month for new home loan applications in November since March 2009. The share of investors soared to record levels. 
What we got in November was an easy decision to cut. After the low third-quarter inflation, and the RBA's preceding signal of a “decision rule” that would reward a very low print, a cut was always likely. The only fly in the ointment was that the previous downward revision to quarter two data was revised right back up! The RBA's board ignored that and the first-quarter data, and decided to hang its hat on quarter three. 
Again, it was not “hard” to cut in the sense of it being a politically or socially difficult decision. Furthermore, the markets had priced it. Consumer confidence bounced back to above-average levels in November, and the RBA was showered in praise for providing those ailing sectors of the economy with much needed relief. 
Equally, it was not “hard” to cut in December. The market was fully pricing it. The politicians were calling for it. The RBA board has now given Wayne Swan and Julia Gillard a significant victory in being able to claim that the mini-budget, and weak public demand generally, have emboldened the RBA to loosen policy (assuming the banks actually play ball and pass on the cut). Making your political masters happy is easy. Every vested interest in the country was calling for "insurance" from the bank over the summer break in case things went awry. In the short term, it costs you nothing to cut rates. So a nine-person committee dominated by private sector business interests is going to have little hesitation in giving out free insurance – to their own constituencies. 
What I have learnt is that it's a mistake to listen to Phil Lowe, Glenn Stevens, or Ric Battellino, and think that their forecasts for the future, and their personal views on the distribution of risks, the dynamics impacting the local economy, and their sterilised vision of how central banking should in theory be undertaken, will prevail through a decision-making process involving a large committee of strong-willed, politically appointed business leaders and the Treasury Secretary. 
When Ian MacFarlane controlled the RBA board with an iron fist, and, in the words one of member, actively stifled debate and dissent, things might have been different. It was easy to be a benign dictator between 1996 and 2007. The economy was cruising along with unprecedented stability. Poor old Glenn Stevens was bequeathed a huge bout of high core inflation in 2007-08, followed by the GFC, higher unemployment, a massive surge in the currency that stretched the domestic economy every which way, and now a bona fide global sovereign debt crisis. 
The RBA board dynamics of today are dramatically different to those that existed in the pre-GFC period. It was easy to be a world-beating governor (and treasurer) when you had a 15-year period of global disinflation, high productivity, robust growth, monotonically declining unemployment and uninterrupted growth. Stevens' challenges have been vastly more complex. As have Wayne Swan's, frankly.
Christopher Joye is a leading financial economist and a director of Rismark International and Yellow Brick Road Funds Management. The above article is not investment advice.
</body></html>

Don't expect the unexpected from the RBA: Christopher Joye

<html><body>
Today I am thrilled to be able to share with you a truly unique insight into the RBA board’s internal machinations. A secretly taped video of a discussion between RBA assistant governor Philip Lowe, who runs the so-called “economic group” and is an influential player at the board level, and one of the RBA’s private sector directors, has surreptitiously come into our possession. We have agreed not to reveal the identity of the individual who sourced this material. Given its sensitivity, please do not share it with anyone! Enjoy.
<div style="text-align: center;">
<iframe border="0" frameborder="0" id="xtranormal_Leaked: secret video of two major bank CEOs chat" marginheight="0" marginwidth="0" name="xtranormal_Leaked: secret video of two major bank CEOs chat" src="https://www.xtranormal.com/xtraplayr/12784379/leaked-secret-video-of-two-major-bank-ceos-chat" style="height: 291px; width: 470px;"></iframe>
</div>
</body></html>

Interest rate policy: Up to some digital mischief, Christopher  Joye imagines pre-RBA decision day internal machinations

<html><body>
Did you know that homes located in 80% of <city><place>Sydney</place></city> suburbs have actually generated capital gains of around 1% over 2011? Adding in attractive rental growth, total returns have been pretty good relative to alternatives like shares. 
It is only the most expensive suburbs in <city><place>Sydney</place></city> that have suffered price declines. These areas have endured a 3.2% fall in value over the course of the year (see the red line in the chart below).
Click to enlarge
<a title="Click to enlarge" rel="shadowbox" href="/images/stories/dec1.gif"><img src="/images/stories/dec1thumb.gif"></a>
We know this because we break up RP Data-Rismark’s patented hedonic indices by suburbs ranked by price. (Dr Tony Richards at the RBA was the first person to ask us to do this.) The chart above graphically highlights the divergence in performance between the cheap and middle-priced regions across Sydney and those more affluent areas, which have been comparatively hard hit. 
We see similar dynamics assert right across <country-region><place>Australia</place></country-region>. For example, the cheapest 20% of suburbs in <city><place>Melbourne</place></city> have recorded capital losses of only 2.3% in 2011. In contrast, <city><place>Melbourne</place></city>’s dearest markets have registered steep 7.4% price falls (see next chart).
Click to enlarge
<a title="Click to enlarge" rel="shadowbox" href="/images/stories/dec12.gif"><img src="/images/stories/dec12thumb.gif"></a>
A portfolio of the most expensive homes across the capital cities has experienced reasonably material capital losses of 5.6% in the year-to-date. The lowest priced homes, by way of comparison, have tapered by less than half this amount, or 2.1% (refer to my third chart).
Click to enlarge
<a title="Click to enlarge" rel="shadowbox" href="/images/stories/dec13.gif"><img src="/images/stories/dec13thumb.gif"></a>
 
So why do we find these differences? A bunch of reasons. The rolling global financial crises that have affected all economies in one way or another originated in the otherwise affluent financial services industry. 
Going forward, retail and investment banks are having to modify their business models, and condition shareholders to substantially lower returns. 
Since credit growth over the next cycle will track incomes, retail banking revenues will grow at appreciably lower rates. 
During the 1990s and 2000s, housing credit in <country-region><place>Australia</place></country-region> expanded at an average annual rate in excess of 12%. That is simply unsustainable. In the long run, credit growth is bounded by growth in incomes (holding all other variables constant), which, on average, advance at single-digit rates. 
To maintain their historical returns, retail banks are having to cut costs. And this is just the beginning. The downward pressure on business expenses will be unrelenting in a world in which major banks can only produce single-digit revenue growth. This in turn means lower salaries and bonuses, and fewer jobs, for some of the nation’s best paid executives. (If you want to watch a funny video skit about bank remuneration in <country-region><place>Australia</place></country-region>, <a href="https://christopherjoye.blogspot.com/2011/11/video-story-about-big-banks-and-rba">check out this</a>.) 
The same principle applies to other companies in the financial services sphere. Investment banks – and their commercial banking cousins – are generally closing down their “proprietary trading” businesses, which is where some of the biggest income earners worked. 
Another key source of investment banking profits, IPOs, has been in a secular malaise since 2007 due to the horrific performance of share markets. Once again, all the investment banks are having to revisit their cost structures with the end game being fewer employees and lower compensation. 
We now know that the financial services industry grew to become too large a part of the economy in the years preceding the crisis. In the words of the RBA governor, Glenn Stevens, it was no longer simply the “hand-maiden of industry”. Economic logic usually ends up prevailing, and the financial services sector is now undergoing a relative retrenchment that will probably continue for years to come. 
For high-end housing that basically means top-end purchasers have skinnier wallets, which is probably one reason why we are seeing expensive suburbs underperform for the time being. 
On the other hand, there will be new sectors of the economy that emerge as winners from the structural adjustment currently taking place. Anyone with an exposure to coal mines in NSW is just one example. 
As a rule, luxury property is much more illiquid and volatile than those homes located in the mass market. Contrary to popular myth, developing expensive homes does not deliver the best returns. 
Which part of the housing market do you think billionaires like Harry Triguboff make their money in? Think properties priced under $750,000 that appeal to the widest possible audience. Put another way, would you rather be the founder of IKEA, or running your local antiques store?
Christopher Joye is a leading financial economist. The above article is not investment advice.
</body></html>

It's an affluent housing correction: Christopher Joye

<html><body>
In the Q+A after his speech last Friday night the RBA governor Glenn Stevens claimed that central bankers are spending a lot of time these days “nowcasting”. That is, trying to figure out exactly how the economy is tracking in the present tense.
In rationalising this allocation of time, he made a statement of the obvious:  unless you know what your starting point is today, it is nigh on impossible to make a credible forecast of where you will be tomorrow.
A more impolite interpretation might be that since the RBA has little faith in its own forecasting prowess – which is why it discarded its November 2010 experiment with ‘pre-emptive monetary policy’ – its next best option is to concentrate its energies on determining how the economy is tracking right now.
That is not as easy as it seems. Even carefully collated data, such as core inflation, is subject to material errors. As regular readers will know, the RBA, media and financial markets were grossly misled by a major downward revision to the second quarter core inflation print.
This had serious ramifications for the RBA’s approach to monetary policy, which it shifted away from a tightening bias. Yet a second revision to these same numbers (which was, therefore, the third time the ABS had attempted to calculate them) increased the Q2 core inflation estimate back up to unacceptably high levels that would normally warrant policy tightening.
Unfortunately, that’s the nature of the imperfect informational beast that the RBA has to grapple with.
Today we get a batch of new data that will shed further light on how <country-region><place>Australia</place></country-region>’s economy is sailing in what is undeniably a stormy global sea. The most important stuff includes the third-quarter capital expenditure data, the ABS’s estimate of capital spending plans over 2011-12, and private credit growth for October.
We also have RP Data-Rismark’s October house price index results, which will show that capital city dwelling prices are down 2.8% in raw terms (4% seasonally adjusted) over the first 10 months of 2011. Given that the dollar value of rents is rising at nearly a 5% per annum rate, this modest 3% to 4% correction in housing costs is no big deal.
Importantly, our house price data precedes the RBA’s crucial November rate cut, which, in concert with record yield curve inversion, has forced home loan rates to plummet to as low at 5.99%.
As a quick aside on the housing market, the ABS tells us that seasonally adjusted housing finance approvals to people buying established homes have increased every month over the last seven months to the end of September.
We also know that consumer confidence in November rose to above-average levels, and, perhaps most importantly, that the previously surveyed expectation among Australian households that rates would rise two to three times in the year ahead has likely evaporated. Today the average Australian family probably expects unchanged rates and/or more cuts.
As I have pointed out before, this means that the “expectational” impact of the RBA’s November cut will be significantly larger than would otherwise be the case.
Have you ever noticed how there tends to be relentless media coverage of deteriorating housing affordability when prices rise, but next to nothing written about improving affordability when prices fall? Without a shadow of doubt, this is the biggest story in the Aussie housing market today.
RP Data-Rismark’s estimate of the national median dwelling price across all regions and dwelling types has fallen from a recent high of $420,000 to $400,000 today. So the cost of Australian housing is unambiguously lower than it was one to two years ago. Concurrently, discounted fixed and variable mortgage rates are now well below their long-term historical averages while disposable incomes per household have been expanding at a healthy 8% per annum pace, according to the ABS’s National Accounts. This has resulted in Rismark’s national dwelling price-to-income ratio falling to its lowest level since before 2003. It is little wonder that first time buyers are returning to the market.
The striking improvement in Australian housing affordability is one reason why Rismark is projecting that there will be a sustained recovery in housing activity by the end of the first quarter next year.
While I am not in the least bit concerned about <country-region>Australia</country-region>’s housing market, given the daily doses of doom and gloom that we are asked to ingest, how is the rest of <country-region><place>Australia</place></country-region>’s economy faring? One needs to address this question before we can turn to the RBA’s December dilemma.
Data flows over the past month or two have confirmed that consumer spending and housing credit are expanding at “new normal” rates that are near household income growth, as you would expect.
Notwithstanding the rhetoric about the specter of a global recession, surveyed business confidence and business conditions remain at trend-like thresholds, which helps explain why business credit growth has recovered of late.
And despite a step-down in job ads and employment growth, Australia’s unemployment rate has remained sticky at a touch above its “full-employment” level.
Beyond the ABS’s small and volatile unemployment survey, we can get further labour market insights by parsing the more comprehensive unemployment benefits data reported by the federal government. In absolute terms, the number of people on the dole has been declining consistently right through to the end of October (see first chart). Expressed as a share of a growing labour force, the decline in dole recipients would be even sharper. There are no signs here of a labour market that is “rolling over”.
Click to enlarge
<a title="Click to enlarge" rel="shadowbox" href="/images/stories/nov301.gif"><img src="/images/stories/nov301thumb.gif"></a>
The government has created a second series that tracks the number of dole recipients who have been looking for jobs for a relatively short period of time. This is illustrated in my next chart. The main take-away is that the number of people looking for jobs has been falling, not rising, albeit at a reduced rate in 2011 compared to the steeper declines evidenced in 2010.
Click to enlarge
<a title="Click to enlarge" rel="shadowbox" href="/images/stories/nov302.gif"><img src="/images/stories/nov302thumb.gif"></a>
Finally, last week we got a major upside surprise with the ABS reporting that “construction work done” in the third quarter printed at +12.5% – its highest rate on record and way above consensus forecasts of a +2% increase. Economists believe that this variable alone has the potential to add as much as 1.5 percentage points to the critical third quarter real GDP data.
The available empirical evidence implies that <country-region><place>Australia</place></country-region>’s overall economy is advancing at a trend pace, although when you lift the bonnet there is significant cross-sectional diversity in the growth experienced by individual industries.
While we always knew that a narrow resources investment boom would make this the case, one tends to hear much more from the noisier “have nots”. This can in turn blur one’s vision in respect of the broader economy’s performance.
Telescoped sources of economic growth can also interfere with the integrity of numerical surveys (or polls) of business conditions/confidence if participants’ responses are not weighted by their contributions to overall growth.
The bottom line is that based on the hard data and the RBA’s forecasts for gradually increasing core inflation over the next few years there seems to be no prima facie case for a rate cut next week.
This view was reinforced by the RBA’s top economist, Dr Phil Lowe, who explained, for the avoidance of any doubt, that following the November rate cut domestic “interest rates now are broadly neutral. They're neither expansionary … nor contractionary for the economy.”
While most economists currently expect the RBA to stay its hand in December, the financial markets have been pricing in a 100% probability of a cut for some time.
The interest rate debate is swirling around what experts think is the RBA’s “policy of least regret.”
In this context, there is universal agreement that the chief near-term risk <country-region><place>Australia</place></country-region> faces is to the funding of our banking system, with the wholesale finance markets that supply about 40% of total bank funding temporarily closed.
The concern is that if the banks feel they cannot fund themselves, they will ration credit, and, by doing so, rather myopically kill off economic growth. Of course, we have been here before during the GFC, and know that contrary to some predictions, the banking system did not fall in a heap.
Why? Because the Government decided to lend its pristine AAA credit rating to all ADIs by providing a taxpayer guarantee of deposits, which make up 50-60% of total bank funding, and through an offer of a taxpayer guarantee of the banks’ wholesale debts. In addition to these two insurance policies, the RBA also lent directly and very cheaply to the banks to provide them with enough funds to meet their day-to-day liabilities. Had the Government and the RBA not acted in this way, many Australian banks would have ended up trading insolvent.
The good news for the banks is that the RBA is in the process of launching another, more formal, bail-out program called the Committed Liquidity Facility, which will furnish banks with a line of credit that they can tap during liquidity crises such as the current one.
The RBA is the first to admit that it does not know what is going to happen in Europe, and what, if any, adverse economic shocks might be sent Australia’s way. It has ample time to watch how things unfold.
If the “nowcasting” Glenn Stevens is increasingly fond of reveals that the economy is about to come to a grinding halt, and if unemployment starts to rise at a surprising rate, he can comfortably cut rates.
Yet dropping rates today in response to bank funding problems prior to his nowcasting telling him to do so is foolish for at least two reasons.
First, there are many much more direct policy measures that can be used to immediately cauterize these issues, such as the assorted taxpayer guarantees and RBA liquidity facilities discussed above.
A cut in interest rates, on the other hand, is likely to be almost entirely absorbed by the banks in the form of margin expansion, which they would argue they need in order to vouchsafe their profitability.
This has two adverse consequences for the RBA and taxpayers.
The first is that if the RBA cuts its cash rate, and the banks don’t pass it on, this undermines the effectiveness of the RBA’s conventional monetary policy instrument. There is a zero lower bound on how far the RBA’s cash rate can go.
If you assume that banks want to maintain, as a minimum, net interest margins of around 2.5%, it is hard to see how mortgage rates can fall below circa 3% to 3.5%. And that assumes no further margin expansion by the banks along the way, which is heroic. So the RBA probably has the ability to reduce actual lending rates by about 300 basis points, give or take.
The point is that the RBA wants to be very careful to disentangle the policy solutions to bank funding problems and those required to stop an economy heading into recession (especially when fiscal policy is purportedly out-of-action).
Confusing the two could hamper your ability to lower market lending rates and thus stimulate the wider economy. Put differently, the RBA should preserve its policy firepower for when it needs it rather than using it to subsidise bank margins.
The issue for households is that if banks absorb RBA cash rate cuts via margin expansion, the RBA is, in effect, facilitating a wealth transfer from the 5 million families with mortgages, who will not get the benefit of lower rates, to bank executives and bank shareholders.
Don't get me wrong. A sustained deterioration in global economic conditions would absolutely warrant deep cuts by the RBA. Yet unlike its peers overseas, the RBA is in the fortunate position of having most domestic debt being issued in ‘variable rate’ form. This means the RBA can make immediate and very significant changes to household cash-flows through adjustments to its policy rate. In many other countries, such as the <country-region>US</country-region> and <country-region><place>UK</place></country-region>, most household debt is fixed-rate and not, therefore, controlled as closely or immediately by the local central bank.
<country-region><place>Australia</place></country-region> does indeed have an economic insurance policy, or a “Stevens’ Put” <a target="_blank" href="https://www.propertyobserver.com.au/trends/will-the-financial-markets-give-the-rba-a-stevens-put-christopher-joye/2011112352496">as I described it in an earlier column</a>. But instead of trading some of that insurance away to vocal bankers and financial market investors, the RBA should preserve it for the maximum benefit of all Australian households.
Christopher Joye is a leading financial economist. The above article is not investment advice.
</body></html>

Should the RBA bail out financial markets?: Christopher Joye

Roseville is poised for a wave of new apartment development following the NSW Government's rezoning of land around Roseville Station under its Transport Oriented Development program.

The new planning controls have unlocked significant development potential within walking distance of the station, with a number of sites expected to be amalgamated and redeveloped in the coming years as developers seek to take advantage of the increased density allowances.

One of the more restrained developments in the precinct, and set among the first to be delivered having commenced well before the recent changes, is Hyecorp's Juliet. The boutique apartment project is already well under construction and remains on track to welcome residents by the end of the year, offering a markedly different proposition to many of the larger-scale developments now likely to emerge across the suburb.

[smartcode_project:default project_id=7395 project_image_fid=278194]

<a href="https://www.apartments.com.au/new-apartments/juliet-roseville-64-pacific-highway-roseville-nsw-2069">Juliet</a> will comprise just&nbsp;34 one-, two-, and three-bedroom apartments opposite Roseville Station. For Hyecorp, which has delivered projects across Sydney's Lower North Shore for more than three decades, Roseville presented a rare opportunity to address a growing gap in the market.

"<a href="https://www.apartments.com.au/developments/roseville-nsw-2069">Roseville</a> has long been one of the North Shore's most tightly held and desirable suburbs, offering a unique combination of village charm, established greenery, excellent transport connections, and proximity to some of Sydney's best schools and lifestyle amenities," Hyecorp said.

"We recognised a growing demand from local homeowners seeking to downsize without leaving the community they have built their lives around. The location presented a rare opportunity to create homes that cater specifically to that buyer profile."

[smartcode_project:default project_id=7395 project_image_fid=278196]

The six-level development has been designed by <a href="https://www.apartments.com.au/architects/pbd-architects">PBD Architects</a> as a collection of residences that feel more like homes than apartments. The brief centred generous floorplans, abundant natural light, quality finishes, and strong connections to outdoor space.

PBD Architects drew inspiration from Roseville's established garden suburb character, creating a building that sits comfortably within its surroundings rather than dominating them. The architecture incorporates natural materials, soft forms, layered landscaping, expansive balconies, and generous setbacks to strengthen the connection between residents and the suburb's leafy environment.

"The focus was on designing spacious, house-like residences for discerning owner-occupiers and downsizers who wanted to remain on the North Shore without compromising on comfort, privacy, or design," PBD said.&nbsp;

"Every apartment was to feel considered, timeless, and highly functional."

[smartcode_project:default project_id=7395 project_image_fid=278195]

Inside, residences feature engineered timber flooring, stone kitchen benchtops and splashbacks, integrated Fisher &amp; Paykel appliances, ducted air conditioning, and large outdoor entertaining areas designed to take advantage of district and treetop views.

Residents will also have access to a rooftop barbecue and lounge area, alongside practical amenities including parcel lockers, EV charging capability, bicycle storage, a dog wash bay, and a basement car wash facility.

The majority of purchasers so far have been local owner-occupiers from Roseville, Lindfield, Chatswood, Killara, and the broader Upper North Shore, many of whom are transitioning from larger family homes.

"Buyers are looking for spacious, house-like apartments that allow them to downsize without feeling like they are sacrificing comfort or functionality," Hyecorp noted.

"They value large kitchens, generous living areas, ample storage, quality finishes, secure parking, lift access, and low-maintenance living."

[smartcode_project:default project_id=7395 project_image_fid=278204]

Juliet sits directly opposite Roseville Train Station and within walking distance of Roseville Village, while Chatswood's retail and dining precinct is only minutes away. The development is also surrounded by some of Sydney's most established schools, including Roseville College, Ravenswood, Pymble Ladies' College, and Knox Grammar, as well as nearby parklands and golf courses.

Juliet is currently more than 75 per cent sold ahead of its anticipated completion in late 2026.

[smartcode_project_cta:default project_id=7395]

Joel Robinson

Juliet to sit quietly amid Roseville apartment boom

Sherpa Property Group has unveiled the third instalment of its Flourish series, securing full approval for the two-tower, $500 million Flourish Soleira development in Palm Beach.

<a href="https://www.apartments.com.au/new-apartments/flourish-soleira-1150-1154-gold-coast-highway-palm-beach-qld-4221">Flourish Soleira</a> will rise from a prominent site in the commercial heart of Palm Beach, the long-time home of Cash Converters and a range of local retailers.

The project will introduce a new retail and dining precinct at ground level, beneath 286 apartments.

[smartcode_project:default project_id=150017 project_image_fid=370959]

“We’re very committed to not only providing affordable residential offerings that are much needed in Palm Beach, but also delivering a vibrant new commercial heart that complements the extraordinary growth of the southern Gold Coast,” Sherpa Property Group founder Christie Leet said.

The development will sit under Sherpa's Flourish brand, which is aimed at providing a pathway into the beachside suburb for locals, first-home buyers and downsizers. In a move designed to assist first-home buyers entering the market, Sherpa has reserved all one and two-bedroom, one-bathroom apartments exclusively for eligible first-home buyers.

[smartcode_project:default project_id=150017 project_image_fid=370964]

“Our vision through Flourish is to create a vibrant retail and lifestyle focal point within the Palm Beach centre zone, delivering thriving communities underpinned by lifestyle-rich locations,” Leet said.

“So far, Flourish has been an incredible success, and we hope to carry this momentum as we progress the next two Flourish projects in Palm Beach.”

[smartcode_project:default project_id=150017 project_image_fid=371430]

Located across 1150-1164 Gold Coast Highway and 3 Sixth Avenue, the development will comprise two towers. The northern tower will deliver 154 apartments, while the southern tower will add a further 132 residences, helping address ongoing demand for new apartments in the tightly held coastal suburb.

Flourish Soleira will also feature the most extensive rooftop amenity offering ever delivered in Palm Beach.

The two towers will be connected by a skybridge, with residents gaining access to a rooftop recreation deck featuring a full-width swimming pool, hot and cold plunge pools, wellness spaces, a gymnasium, private dining facilities, massage treatment rooms, barbecue areas, a basketball court, golf simulator, indoor and outdoor dining spaces, sun lounges and extensive landscaping.

LPS Group is expected to start construction later this year.

Sherpa is already well advanced on construction of its debut Flourish project, Flourish Amargo, located just around the corner from Soleira. Meanwhile, Flourish Oasis, positioned opposite Amargo, recently commenced construction and has nearly sold out its collection of 47 apartments.

[smartcode_project_cta:default project_id=150017]

Sherpa unveils $500m mixed-use Palm Beach precinct, Flourish Soleira

Are mortgage holders set to get a reprieve from the RBA in 2026?

Big Four bank NAB believes so. They are now expecting the next move from the RBA to be a cut, rather than a hike, which they had pencilled in for August. They are unsure of the timing of the cut however, they note in their latest&nbsp;NAB Economics RBA Watch.

NAB Chief Economist, Dr Sally Auld, said recent data suggests the economy has lost momentum and the outlook for rates has shifted, noting that the broader economic backdrop has changed since earlier in the year.

“The next move in the cash rate is likely to be down, but the timing is uncertain," Dr Auld said.

"In February, growth was above trend, the economy was operating above capacity and there was uncertainty over the restrictiveness of rates. None of these conditions exist today,” she outlined.

Dr Auld said recent data pointed to softer momentum across the economy while acknowledging that at the same time, uncertainty remains a key feature of the outlook.

“Both Q1 GDP data and the NAB business survey suggest momentum in the economy has slowed, meaning that growth has likely peaked for the cycle. That said, we are cognisant there is still considerable uncertainty around the outlook, both with respect to activity and inflation.”

Dr Auld said inflation risks and labour market outcomes would be important to watch.

“On the prices side, we are still forecasting above target core inflation through to mid-2027. Margins will compress and weaker labour market outcomes are a risk.”

She said tighter financial conditions are expected to weigh on housing and activity.

“Tighter financial conditions will be reflected in a slowing in house price growth and housing credit growth. In summary, we have greater conviction that the next move in rates is down, but less conviction on the timing.”

Mortgage relief? NAB forecasts RBA rate cut, not hike, after softer economic conditions

A local downsizer has splashed $6.5 million on a penthouse in Perifa's Alex &amp; Willow development in Crows Nest. 
&nbsp; 
The purchaser sold their long-held family home in the area before embarking on a six-month search for the right apartment. After inspecting a range of options across the Lower North Shore, the buyer returned to <a href="https://www.apartments.com.au/new-apartments/alex-willow-crows-nest-82-90-alexander-street-crows-nest-nsw-2065">Alex &amp; Willow</a>. 
&nbsp; 
The buyer profile reflects the project’s broader purchaser mix. <a>Alex &amp; Willow</a> has attracted predominantly local downsizers looking to transition from larger homes without compromising on space or quality, alongside a smaller cohort of upsizers and investors drawn to the project’s location and design credentials. 
&nbsp; 
The milestone sale comes as the project, developed by&nbsp;<a href="https://www.apartments.com.au/developers/perifa">Perifa</a>&nbsp;and delivered by <a href="https://www.apartments.com.au/builders/versatile-made-construction">Versatile Construction</a>, both part of Versatile Group, reaches 60 per cent sold.

[smartcode_project:default project_id=6680 project_image_fid=371325] 
&nbsp; 
Eddie Mansour, Managing Partner of <a href="https://www.apartments.com.au/project-marketer/ray-white-projects">Ray White Projects</a>, said the result demonstrates not only a headline price but also depth of demand. 
&nbsp; 
“This is an exceptional outcome and a clear reflection of sustained buyer demand for premium, well-located downsizer product,” Mansour said.

“We’re seeing a consistent pattern of local homeowners selling family residences and reinvesting into high-quality apartments that allow them to remain within their community. Alex &amp; Willow has resonated strongly with this group because it offers genuine scale, thoughtful design and immediate proximity to the village.” 
&nbsp; 
The sale reflects a broader and consistent trend of local downsizers actively seeking high-quality, low-maintenance residences close to established village centres. Agents report that demand for this product type has remained resilient, particularly where developments offer a rare combination of scale, design quality and walkable amenity. 
&nbsp;&nbsp; 
Fabrizio Perilli, Managing Director of Perifa and Versatile Group, said the sale marks a defining moment for the project. 
&nbsp; 
“The penthouse sale is a strong endorsement of the quality we have delivered, alongside our partners, and the clear demand from local downsizers for premium, boutique residences in this location,” Perilli said.&nbsp; 
&nbsp; 
“Most importantly, we’re proud to see the Alex &amp; Willow community beginning to take shape. As we move closer to completion, we’re looking forward to welcoming residents and seeing the project come to life.”&nbsp;

[smartcode_project:default project_id=6680 project_image_fid=338516] 
&nbsp; 
Designed by <a href="https://www.apartments.com.au/architects/nettletontribe">Nettleton Tribe</a> with interiors by <a href="https://www.apartments.com.au/interior-designers/richards-stanisich">Richards Stanisich</a>, Alex &amp; Willow is a boutique collection of generously sized two- and three-bedroom residences in the heart of Crows Nest village.&nbsp;

Completion is slated for early 2027.

[smartcode_project_cta:default project_id=6680]

Alex & Willow, Crows Nest penthouse sells off the plan for $6.5 million

Fresh from launching the first stage of its Wollongong precinct, <a href="https://www.apartments.com.au/new-apartments/keira-place-wollongong-120-122-smith-street-wollongong-nsw-2500">Keira Place</a>, builder-developer Urban Property Group has unveiled plans for the next phase of the masterplanned community.

Now on public exhibition through the NSW Government's Housing Delivery Authority pathway is a State Significant Development Application for a further 657 homes on the prominent gateway site opposite Beaton Park.

The proposal comprises three buildings, including two build-to-sell towers rising 25 and 30 storeys, delivering 391 apartments, alongside a 12-storey co-living building with 266 residences, making it one of the largest co-living proposals currently planned in regional New South Wales.

Of the apartments proposed in the build-to-sell towers, the majority, 310, are two-bedroom dwellings. The balance comprises 44 one-bedroom apartments and 37 three-bedroom residences. Apartment sizes range from around 50 sqm for one-bedroom homes to approximately 90 sqm for three-bedroom apartments.

<img alt="Smith St" data-entity-type="file" data-entity-uuid="19347059-1612-41a0-9c74-b86a657237f8" src="https://s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/www.urban.com.au/s3fs-public/inline-images/Screenshot%202026-06-10%20at%2010.02.18%E2%80%AFAM.png?VersionId=sWXnaCcA.cIC6N8YT1dg5pJ2e1V3Z6z7" />

The submission says the proposal has evolved significantly from its original Housing Delivery Authority application following extensive consultation with the State Design Review Panel and Wollongong City Council.

The final scheme has been designed to align with the emerging vision for the Flinders Street Precinct, an area identified by Council as a future high-density mixed-use neighbourhood capable of accommodating substantial housing growth close to transport, employment and community infrastructure.

According to the design report prepared by COX Architecture, the development aims to "deliver a built outcome consistent with the future character of the Wollongong CBD while responding to the site's unique constraints and opportunities."

"Our vision for the next phase of the site evolution in Wollongong is grounded in three design pillars that guide the design response: place, natural environment and celebration," COX said.

"Inspired by its surroundings and grounded in the stories of place on Wodi Wodi Country, the design proposal acknowledges the established character of its setting while creating a unique and timeless identity that sits harmoniously within it.

"The design proposal responds to its specific site conditions, acknowledging the vegetation, climate, wind conditions and solar access of the site."

The architecture responds directly to the site's position between Wollongong's urban core and its natural landscape setting.

COX identified views towards Mount Keira and the Illawarra Escarpment as defining features of the site, while the upper levels of the towers will also capture expansive views across the city and out to the Pacific Ocean.

The design team has positioned the tallest buildings closer to the rail corridor, where overshadowing impacts can be better managed while establishing a landmark built form on the northern approach into the city.

<img alt="Smith St" data-entity-type="file" data-entity-uuid="79580d5b-500c-4ebf-9629-797146a4a694" src="https://s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/www.urban.com.au/s3fs-public/inline-images/Screenshot%202026-06-10%20at%209.51.59%E2%80%AFAM.png?VersionId=WbTB1EKSG.KDfsfz0F3wp1QVa2oCMGR5" />

Urban Property Group secured the 11,000 sqm Smith Street site in 2022 and has since progressed plans for the broader Keira Place precinct.

Construction recently commenced on the first stage of Keira Place, which will deliver 150 apartments across two residential buildings, including 27 affordable housing apartments and 18 specialist disability accommodation dwellings, alongside activated ground-floor retail and commercial space.

Urban Co-CEO Patrick Elias said the commencement of construction marked a significant milestone for Wollongong and reflected the developer's long-term commitment to regional cities.

"Today's groundbreaking is about turning approvals into homes and moving quickly to deliver much-needed housing in Wollongong's city centre," Elias said.

"Keira Place will provide a diverse mix of homes close to jobs, transport and services, while setting a high benchmark for quality, durability and consumer protection."

Read more:&nbsp;<a href="https://www.apartments.com.au/news/nsw/groundbreaking-marks-start-of-construction-at-keira-place-in-wollongong-cbd">Groundbreaking marks start of construction at Keira Place in Wollongong CBD</a>

&nbsp;

&nbsp;

&nbsp;

Christopher Joye

Editor's Picks

Have something to contribute?

Developments

New apartments

New townhouses

News